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Abstract: In this introductory chapter to a collective volume,
* we build on 
Baumol‘s (1990) framework to categorize, catalog, and classify the budding 
research  field  that  explores  the  interplay  between  institutions  and 
entrepreneurship. Institutions channel entrepreneurial supply into productive 
or  unproductive  activities,  which  likely  accounts  for  a  great  deal  of  the 
disparate economic development of nations. What‘s more, entrepreneurship 
is not only influenced by institutions—entrepreneurs often shape institutions 
themselves. Entrepreneurship abiding by existing institutions is occasionally 
disruptive  enough  to  challenge  the  foundations  of  prevailing  institutions. 
Entrepreneurs also have the opportunity to evade institutions, which tends to 
undermine the effectiveness of the institutions in question, or cause them to 
change  for  the  better.  Lastly,  entrepreneurs  can  directly  alter  institutions 
through  innovative  political  entrepreneurship.  Similar  to  business 
entrepreneurship,  innovative  political  activity  can  be  either  productive  or 
unproductive, depending on the entrepreneurs‘ incentives. 
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INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK 
 
The growing recognition of how institutions determine economic outcomes has been 
one of the most important developments in economic research and policy analysis in 
the  last  two  decades.  At  the  same  time,  the  entrepreneur  himself  has  made  a 
comeback, resurrected as one of the prime movers in society. Needless to say, the two 
subjects are not unrelated. Baumol‘s seminal work (Chapter 1), followed by Murphy, 
Shleifer and Vishny‘s (Chapter 2) related, yet independent contribution, showed that 
institutions  determine  not  only  the  level,  but  also  the  type  of  entrepreneurship. 
Individuals  put  their entrepreneurial talent  to  use in  activities that are  productive, 
unproductive or destructive. The institutional setup—or, ―the rules of the game‖—
dictate relative returns, and hence the allocation across these activities.  
 
However, institutions do not merely control entrepreneurs—entrepreneurs also control 
them,  through  business  activity,  evasive  methods  and  political  entrepreneurship 
(Henrekson and Sanandaji 2011). This volume explores both sides of this important 
interaction:  how  the  institutional  framework  influences  entrepreneurship  and  how 
entrepreneurs in turn influence the emergence and evolution of institutions.  
 
In  organizing  this  collection,  we  follow  Baumol‘s  lead  in  distinguishing  between 
productive  and  unproductive/destructive  entrepreneurship.  We  simplify  his 
classification,  however,  by  merging  destructive  and  merely  unproductive 
entrepreneurship into just one category, unproductive entrepreneurship. By doing so, 
we  can  direct  our  attention  toward  another  element:  entrepreneurs‘  response  to 
institutions. Entrepreneurs can abide by institutions, or evade them; sometimes, they 
may even alter institutions. This creates a 2 x 3 matrix, where each entrepreneurial 
activity can be assigned to one of the six types. 
   2 
  ABIDE  EVADE  ALTER 
PRODUCTIVE 




Sidestep stifling labor 
market regulations 
through a new  
contractual form. 
Provide a new local 
public good, private 
security firms.  
UNPRODUCTIVE/ 
DESTRUCTIVE 
Sue competitors for 




Bribe a government 
official to obtain a 
contract. Illegal 
syndicates. 
Lobby for new 
regulation to protect an 
industry. Repeal 
property rights to 
plunder a wealthy 
group. 
Figure 1. A typology of entrepreneurship and some illustrative examples. 
 
 
ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME 
 
The volume is divided in eight parts, six of which follow the matrix defined in Figure 
1. Only brief summaries or representative samples of each article will be provided 
here; we encourage the reader to explore each in full.  
 
o  Part  I  presents  the  two  seminal  articles  that  set  the  tone  for  this  area  of 
research. 
 
o  Part II discusses traditional productive business entrepreneurship that adheres 
to the rules of society, and how institutions mold this behavior.  
 
o  Part  III  tackles  entrepreneurship  in  dire  institutional  settings,  where 
entrepreneurs have an incentive to pursue rent-seeking purposes rather than 
wealth  creation.  Rent-seeking  entrepreneurship  in  post-transition  Russia  is 
explored to illustrate this phenomenon.  
 
o  Part IV and V show how alert individuals can change the broader rules of the 
game in ways that either benefit or harm society. In addition to the traditional 
business entrepreneurs from the economic sciences, political entrepreneurs can 
also endeavor in a similar fashion.  
   3 
o  Parts  VI  and  VII  take  up  entrepreneurs  who  evade  prevailing  rules  while 
engaging in productive and unproductive activities, respectively.  
 
o  Part  VIII  presents  the  institutional  entrepreneur  as  customarily  defined  in 
sociology, discussing how this creature compares to the entrepreneur in the 
economic and political sciences.  
 
 
PART I  GENERAL 
 
Both  Baumol  (Chapter  1)  and  Murphy  et  al.  (Chapter  2)  define  the  entrepreneur 
according to a set of talents. There is no consensus in the literature regarding the 
nature of these talents; some scholars emphasize cognitive abilities while others point 
to  motivation  or  preferences.  Our  definition  includes  both:  entrepreneurial  talent 
combines perceptiveness and the ability to detect opportunities—and undertake new 
ventures in response. Profitable business projects, the chance to appropriate or earn 
rents and the possibility to affect policy are all explored in this volume. 
 
Self-employment  and  start-ups  embody  the  most  typical  forms  of  business 
entrepreneurship. Yet our way of defining entrepreneurship excludes many forms of 
self-employment, however. Most importantly, non-innovative self-employment does 
not qualify as entrepreneurship. In reality, though, it is impossible to draw a clear 
boundary  between  truly  innovative  entrepreneurship  and  non-innovative  self-
employment;  as  a  result,  we  organize  self-employment  activity  into  a  continuum 
stretching from purely non-innovative to highly dynamic entrepreneurship.  
 
Baumol‘s  analysis  extends  Schumpeter‘s  (1934)  theory  of  innovations  into  new 
combinations,  particularly  in  regard  to  productive  entrepreneurship.  Innovative 
entrepreneurship may be, and often is, incremental in nature, progressing in small 
steps over long periods of time. The same is true for political entrepreneurship.  
 
Unproductive/destructive  entrepreneurship,  on  the  other  hand,  entails  some 
combination of rent-seeking technologies that enables the entrepreneur to appropriate 
rents from other agents. The social product may remain unaffected throughout this 
process,  as  in  the  case  of  a  simple  transfer,  or  be  lowered,  as  in  destructive   4 
entrepreneurship. Using the terminology of the neoclassical theory of the firm, the 
distinction between the different types amounts to an inward (destructive) or outward 
(productive) shift of the production possibility frontier. 
 
Given  the  definition  of  entrepreneur ship,  it  is  simply  hard  to  believe  that 
entrepreneurs respond passively to institutions. Indeed, theories within the school of 
new  institutional  economics  usually  describe  the  entrepreneur  as  a  key  agent  in 
institutional change. North (1990), for instance, holds that entrepreneur s act on the 
fringe of a given institutional setup, embodying dynamism and change in a setting 
where institutions are otherwise meant to determine their behavior. This is broadly 
consistent with the framework presented here. A second dimension of our typology 
distinguishes behavior within the institutions‘ limits from behavior directed at evading 
such constraints. Evasive entrepreneurship is an activity aimed at circumventing the 
institutional framework. Finally, entrepreneurs may alter institutions through political 
activity. These definitions are illustrated in Figure 1.
1  
 
The relative payoff of abiding, evading  or altering institutions influences which type 
of entrepreneurship is pursued , much like the allocation between productive and 
unproductive/destructive entrepreneurship (Baumol, Chapter 1). It is important to 
keep  the  vertical  distinctions  in  Figure  1  (from  productive  to 
unproductive/destructive)  distinct  from the horizontal ones (choosing to follow a 
career as an abiding business entrepreneur, an ev asive [legal or illegal] entrepreneur 
or an altering political entrepreneur).  It is for example  unclear whether evasive 
entrepreneurship is prone to be productive or unproductive. This probably depends on 
the specific institutions being evaded, and whether the  entrepreneur‘s alternative to 
evasion is either inaction or carrying out activity within the institutional framework. 
Baumol and Murphy et al. both make the point that it is usually a bad sign if talented 
potential  business  managers  become  trial  lawyers  or  lobbyists  instead.  In  our 
representation,  however,  this  allocation  constitutes  both  a  horizontal  and  vertical 
move;  if  talent  moves  from  the  business  world  to  productive  altering 
                                                 
1 As will be discussed, both abiding and evasive entrepreneurship can have the unintentional result of 
changing institutions. Altering entrepreneurship, on the other hand, involves a direct aim to change 
institutions.   5 
entrepreneurship,  improving policies and changing institutions for the better   as a 
result, total social welfare may very well be bettered.  
 
Baumol  only  describes  business  entrepreneurs  as  productive  entrepreneurship, 
whereas  other  entrepreneurial  activities  (such  as  joining  the  bureaucracy)  are 
discussed solely in unproductive terms. Similarly, Murphy et al. contrast productive 
entrepreneurship  and  unproductive  (implicitly  non-entrepreneurial)  rent  seeking  in 
their  discussion  of  talent  allocation.  In  our  categorization,  both  institution-abiding 
business  entrepreneurship  and  institution-altering  political  entrepreneurship  can  be 
productive.  Even  evasive  entrepreneurship  can  be  productive,  both  directly  (by 
evading institutions that hamper production) and indirectly (by forcing a change in 
such institutions). This does not amount to a disagreement with Baumol and Murphy 
et  al.;  rather,  it  merely  arises  from  our  including  two  categories—evading  and 
altering—that they did not. 
 
In practice, however, not all activity can be neatly categorized by our definitions. 
Entrepreneurship can incorporate aspects of evasion and alteration at the same time, 
seen in the example of employing both boycotts and passive resistance to change a 
law. The sole aim of the matrix is to give some structure to the discussion, and does 
not claim perfect and mutually exclusive categorization.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that institutions that direct talent to different activities do 
not  necessarily  affect  exactly  the  same  individuals.  If  the  rules  of  the  game  in  a 
country were to change in favor of business entrepreneurship, a successful influence 
peddler  would  not  automatically  become  an  industrialist.  Rather,  some  marginal 
individuals  with  talent  for  influence  peddling  might  leave  that  profession,  while 
agents with business talent (who may or may not have been political entrepreneurs 
previously) enter that sector. 
 
 
PART II  PRODUCTIVE ABIDING ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
The  abiding  market  entrepreneur  is  the  archetypical  entrepreneur,  the  one  most 
discussed  in  the  literature.  Productive  business  entrepreneurship  increases  an 
economy‘s  degree  of  innovation  and  its  ability  to  adapt  to  exogenous  conditions.   6 
Innovativeness  forms  the  core  of  Schu mpeter‘s  (1934)  entrepreneur,  whereas 
Kirzner‘s (1973, 1992, 2009) entrepreneur is marked by the ability to adapt.
2 While 
productive entrepreneurship is important in all economies, the need for adaptation and 
innovativeness depends on the external environment. For instance, when high rates of 




The relationship between abiding entrepreneurship and the evolution of institutions is 
complex. On the one hand, truly innova tive entrepreneurship can create so much 
change  that  the  foundation  of  the  current  institutional  structure  becomes 
compromised. Truly disruptive entrepreneurship, such as the successful introduction 
of a revolutionary new technology, can lead to the reform  and dissolution of extant 
institutions, notably in traditional societies. Technological progress can also alter the 
effect of institutions; one salient and recent example is the impact of the Internet on 
intellectual property rights. 
 
On the other hand, entrepreneurship can be self-perpetuating. It creates a constituency 
of  consumers,  private-sector workers and  self -employed  who support  productive 
institutions.  Tec hnological  breakthroughs  often  offer  opportunities  for  new 
entrepreneurship,  both  of  the  ma rket  and  political  type.  No  less  importantly, 
productive  entrepreneurship  legitimates  the  instit utions  that  foster  it  by  creating 
demonstrable new wealth, products and jobs. The American economic system, with 
its high degree of inequality coupled with the opportunity to grow fabulously rich, has 
maintained  its  legitimacy  largely  because  entrepreneurs  ranging  from  Andrew 
Carnegie to Bill Gates have created new value that has benefited the public as a whole 
(Acs and Phillips, 2002). Furthermore,  entrepreneurs (and non-entrepreneurs)  who 
abide by institutions tend to strengthen these very institutions. This is particularly 
important for informal institutions, such as codes of conduct and traditions, which are 
                                                 
2 See Baumol (2010), Holcombe (2007) and Yu (2001) for discussions of these two aspects and how 
they can be combined in the same system. See also Kirzner (2009) for a critical assessment of such 
merging.  
3 It could be noted that abiding entrepreneurship is not limited to market or business entrepreneurship. 
The non-profit sector is a sizable share of the economy in countries such as the United States, and 
includes a large amount of productive non-market entrepreneurship. Boettke and Coyne (2009) discuss 
social entrepreneurship and its relation to institutions  further. Compared to market entrepreneurship , 
social entrepreneurship is more likely to be a combination of abiding and altering  activity towards 
institutions.    7 
reinforced each time they are acknowledged and allowed to guide behavior. In terms 
of more formal institutions, the law itself derives much of its value from the respect 
that it is awarded (Kasper and Streit, 1998). Becker and Murphy (2000) use the 
neoclassical economic framework to argue that institutions ar e reinforced through 
abiding  behavior.  They  cite  the  United  States  Constitution  as  an  example  of  an 
institution whose rules have been strengthened as Americans throughout history have 
followed its guiding principles. In contrast, similar constitutions in o ther countries, 
notably in Latin America, have been weakened over time as each violation of its 
principles has reduced people‘s respect for both the constitution and tradition.  
 
Guiso,  Sapienza  and  Zingales  (Chapter  4)  empirically  demonstrate  that  informal 
institutions impact economic activity. They show in particular that an individual‘s 
level of trust in the United States (their proxy for trustworthiness) has a significant 
impact  on  the  probability  of  their  becoming  self-employed.  Employing  a  cross-
country setting, Lerner and Schoar (Chapter 3) demonstrate the importance of formal 
institutions  such  as  the  legal  system  for  private  equity  investments  in  developing 
countries. Private equity investments in nations with effective legal enforcement are 
more likely to use preferred stock, and have more contractual protection of the private 
equity group.  
 
Davidsson and Henrekson (Chapter 5) investigate the role of institution and policy in 
Sweden, arguing that the low prevalence of high-growth firms can be tied to welfare 
state institutions that fail to provide fertile ground for entrepreneurial activity.   
 
Acs et al. (Chapter 6) is perhaps the article in this volume that least directly connected 
to institutions. However, the theory outlined in the paper gives an important clue as to 
why the institutional setup is so important for productive business entrepreneurship, 
and why entrepreneurship in turn is important for innovation and growth. The authors 
note that full property rights for knowledge do not exist; existing firms are unable to 
appropriate  all  knowledge  of  the  economy.  The  resulting  knowledge  spillovers 
endogenously explain entrepreneurial activity. Importantly, knowledge is separated 
from economic knowledge, the later requiring entrepreneurship to be brought to the 
market. In their model, institutions impose a gap between knowledge and economic 
knowledge.  Furthermore,  taxes,  stricter  regulation,  administrative  barriers  and   8 
government intervention are thought to reduce entrepreneurship and the marketization 
of knowledge.  
 
 
PART III  UNPRODUCTIVE ABIDING ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
Of course, not all rent seeking is truly entrepreneurial in the Schumpeterian sense of 
being innovative. Even Kirzner‘s broader definition of alertness to opportunity cannot 
place  all  rent  seeking  in  the  entrepreneurial  camp,  even  if  bribery  were  fully 
institutionalized. Defining evasive entrepreneurship involves delineating a continuous 
variable  into  a  discrete  definition.  This  is  not  unique  to  unproductive  abiding 
entrepreneurship;  the  same  problem  exists  within  traditional  productive 
entrepreneurship, especially when determining which self-employed business owners 
can truly be labeled entrepreneurs. For our purposes it suffices that some of the rent-
seeking  activity  be  novel  in  nature,  for  example  corrupting  a  hitherto  honest 
government official.  
 
In addition to historical examples from underdeveloped societies, Baumol (Chapter 7) 
discusses  institutional  entrepreneurs  in  developed  countries  as  professional 
influencers of the law. He describes enterprising methods of molding institutions in 
the  United  States,  as  well  as  more  routine  lobbying  activities.  This  chapter  is  an 
important  reminder  that  unproductive  entrepreneurship  is  not  confined  to  historic 
states  or underdeveloped societies,  but is  still part of the American  (and  Western 
European) economy. Clearly, our institutions still direct part of society‘s talent into 
individually profitable but socially wasteful activities. This is not only relevant from a 
policy  perspective,  but  also  as  a  part  of  the  research  agenda  of  institutions  and 
entrepreneurship.  
 
Faccio  (Chapter  8)  documents  that  firms  undertake  rent-seeking  behavior  in  most 
countries  under  review,  including  most  Western  societies.  Corporate  political 
connections occur in thirty-five out of the forty-seven nations that Faccio studies. The 
analysis details that such rents are likely to be shared between politicians and the 
corporate  sector,  or,  in  our  terminology,  between  political  entrepreneurs  and 
unproductive  business  entrepreneurs.  We  have  seen  that  entrepreneurial  talent  is 
funneled into rent seeking in all societies, to varying extents. Yet few countries can   9 
hold a candle to post-transition Russia in illustrating the vicious cycle of unproductive 
entrepreneurship. In Faccio‘s study, politically connected firms in Russia account for 
an astonishing 87 percent of market capitalization, the highest rate in the world. In 
comparison, politically connected American firms account for just 4 percent of U.S. 
market capitalization. 
 
According to Åslund et al. (2002), post-Soviet Russia is locked in an ―under-reform 
trap‖.  Institutions  that  reward  rent-seeking  activities  over  productive  activities 
dominate the economy, and political influence from the Russian private sector can 
often be traced to oligarchs (Guriev and Rachinsky, Chapter 9). This group consists of 
people from the former Soviet nomenclature who seized power over the companies 
they managed after the fall of the Soviet Union. The oligarchs took advantage of the 
huge  arbitrage  opportunities  created  by  partial  reforms  and  the  co-existence  of 
regulated and quasi-market prices during the Gorbachev era. Djankov et al. (Chapter 
10) investigate the role of perceptions of the institutional environment for business 
owners in post-transition Russia, also touching on the importance of bribing officials 
in that climate. 
 
There is no denying that rising from virtually nothing to amassing billions in the era 
of post-Soviet reform requires entrepreneurial talent. However, most activity was non-
productive; wealth was generated by taking control over firms or plundering them 
rather than creating new value. Kalantaridis and Labrianidis (2004) argue that the 
most important group of entrepreneurs during the transition period were ―directors of 
the Socialist Era‖ who were ―individuals in positions of authority during the socialist 
era, who adapted successfully to change‖.  
 
Unproductive entrepreneurship in Russia has proven self-reinforcing in at least two 
ways.  First, the legitimacy of free market  capitalism  was  deeply  damaged by the 
initial era of unproductive entrepreneurship. Second, today‘s oligarchs continue to use 
their political power to defend the current system, exemplified by their takeover of the 
Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs. Slinko et al. (2005) underscore the 
negative effects of the establishment‘s political influence, finding that large firms with 
high political stakes can prevent the entry of new firms. Aidis et al. (Chapter 11) 
show that Russia has less business entrepreneurship than other transition countries,   10 
and that Russian institutions provide advantages to insiders over new ventures. In 
comparison  to  other  transition  economies,  Russian  entrepreneurs  face  more 
corruption,  higher  official  and  unofficial  start -up  costs,  higher  tax  rates,  more 
bureaucracy, and weaker protection of property rights (Åslund et al., 2002).  
 
Russia  illustrates  the  difficulty  in  delineating  abiding  and  altering  institutional 
entrepreneurship.  Since  entrepreneurship  is  defined  by  change,  all  political 
entrepreneurship is altering in some sense. However, most of this activity in Russia 
focuses  on  pure  rent  seeking,  and  at  best  only  marginally  amends  the  broader 
institutional setup. Indeed, Russia is now well into its second decade of institutionally 
stable  crony  capitalism,  with  roughly  one  hundred  individuals  having  amassed 
fortunes  in  excess  of  one  billion  dollars,  for  a  total  wealth  of  almost  250  billion 
dollars (Sanandaji 2010).  
 
 
PART IV  PRODUCTIVE ALTERING ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
Baumol (Chapter 1) describes productive entrepreneurship solely in terms of private 
sector  business  activity.  However,  other  types  of  entrepreneurship  can  also  be 
productive. Clearly, not all political activities can be defined as rent seeking; policy 
innovations often improve welfare, especially in favorable institutional environments. 
The National Science Foundation, for example, was created in part through political 
entrepreneurship (Polsby, 1984). Similarly, Murphy et al. (Chapter 2) identify talent 
directed toward the political sector as rent seeking, assuming that the institutional 
setting  that  directs  the  allocation  of  talent  is  exogenously  determined.  Good 
institutions do not rise out of nowhere, though, and are often the result of policy 
entrepreneurship by gifted pivotal individuals. The productive political entrepreneur 
deserves recognition as a fundamental player in the economy, just like the productive 
market entrepreneur. 
 
The  idea  that  innovative  individuals  contribute  to  institutional  change  has  a  long 
history in political science. In his case study of political power in New Haven, Dahl 
(1961) introduced the term ―political entrepreneurs,‖ which he defined as individuals 
who recombine resources in the policy arena to bring about change. The political 
arena in New Haven was entrepreneurial in its alertness to ―citizen desires‖ and ―the   11 
ease with which the political stratum can be penetrated‖ (Dahl, 1961, p. 93) by new 
individuals.  In  accordance  with  political  scientists,  we  also  use  the  term  political 
entrepreneurship  to  refer  to  entrepreneurship  with  the  direct  aim  of  altering 
institutions. The expression business or market entrepreneur is used here, somewhat 
loosely, to  refer to  traditional  Schumpeterian entrepreneurs,  distinct from  political 
entrepreneurs. Similar to business entrepreneurs, political entrepreneurs are alert to 
opportunities,  bear  risk,  reorganize  coalitions  and  resources,  and  ultimately  bring 
about innovation, be it socially positive or negative.  
 
Ostrom (1965) in her study of ground water basin management observed that 
 
the vast variety of organizational forms among municipal and public corporations 
would  appear  to  provide  substantial  latitude  for  the  exercise  of  a  public 
entrepreneurship. In such an institutional setting there should be opportunities for 
persons  to  engage  in  public  entrepreneurship  by  organizing  new  enterprise  to 
secure appropriate forms of community action in providing common goods and 
services. (Ostrom, 1965, p. 5) 
 
She  also  points  out  the  importance  of  the  quality  of  the  broader  institutional 
environment for enabling productive policy entrepreneurship:  
 
The capacity to engage in public entrepreneurship is defined by a political system. 
Constitutional ground rules which stress the right of local communities to self-
determination  lay  a  framework  for  an  extensive  and  varied  public  enterprise 
system. Legislative enactments which specify the general rules of procedure for 
incorporation  of  municipalities  or  public  districts  or  other  public  corporations 
provide the working rules which public entrepreneurs must follow in proceeding to 
undertake a new enterprise. (Ostrom, 1965, p. 6) 
 
Inspired by emerging markets in Asia, Li et al. (Chapter 12) define a new form of 
institutional  entrepreneurship.  While  seeking  profits  in  undeveloped  institutional 
environments,  business  entrepreneurs  help  advance  market  institutions,  a  kind  of 
positive  social  externalities  in  institutional  terms.  This  type  of  entrepreneurship 
straddles abiding, evading and altering entrepreneurship, containing elements of all 
three types. Of the four categories in Li et al., the first two involve lobbying for better 
institutions and can be neatly categorized as altering entrepreneurship. The third and 
especially fourth type are mixtures of abiding and evading entrepreneurship, resulting 
in changes for the better in the institutional climate in developing countries. 
   12 
Leeson and Boettke (Chapter 13) advance research on institutional entrepreneurship 
by exploring the production of technology designed to protect property rights. This 
type of entrepreneurship can improve the institutional environment, especially if a 
well-functioning state is absent. They illustrate this idea with examples from Somalia, 
where private protection technology  can have led to an increase in some  economic 
activity since the collapse of the government.  
 
Hwang  and  Powell  (Chapter  14)  survey  the  neo -institutionalist  literature  on 
entrepreneurship, and discuss a variety of institutional alterations, including changes 
in informal institutions and the professional standards as part of the rules of the game.  
 
Schneider  and  Teske  (Chapter  15)  show  how  the  standard  market  theory  of 
entrepreneurship  can  be  fruitfully  applied  to  altering  political  entrepreneurship, 
including innovation in local government.  
 
 
PART V  UNPRODUCTIVE ALTERING ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
DiLorenzo  (1988)  emphasizes  the  unproductive  and  destructive  activities  of  rent-
seeking  political  entrepreneurs,  writing  that  ―[t]he  essence  of  political 
entrepreneurship is to destroy wealth through negative-sum rent-seeking behavior‖ (p. 
66,  italics  in  original).  He  maintains  that  ignoring  political  entrepreneurs  has  led 
public  choice  theorists  to  underestimate  the  destructive  effects  of  politics.  We 
conclude in turn that focus on rent seeking has led to an underestimation of the total 
dynamic  potential  embodied  in  institutional  change,  both  when  channeled 
productively and unproductively/destructively.  
 
Holcombe  (Chapter  16)  presents  the  Austrian  perspective  on  political 
entrepreneurship,  concluding  that  due  to  the  differences  in  incentive  structures, 
political entrepreneurship is by nature more likely to be unproductive than market 
entrepreneurship. He remarks that (p. 147)  
 
if political goals are not being implemented in the least-cost way, then there is a 
profit opportunity from restructuring the nature of the government activity so that 
the goals are achieved at least cost. The cost savings are a political profit that the 
entrepreneur can then apply toward the satisfaction of other goals.   13 
 
Both types of activities are carried out in modern developed democracies—at times, 
even  concurrently—often  leaving  the  observer  to  decide  whether  the  policy 
innovation  was  productive or destructive (at  least  as  long as the reform  does  not 
clearly  violate  the  Pareto  efficiency).  Wagner  (1966)  argues  that  political 
entrepreneurs can act as a substitute for the rent-seeking activities of large interest 
groups,  mitigating  in  turn  the  central  difficulties  in  overcoming  collective  action 
problems and organizing interest groups emphasized by Olson (1965).  
 
The incentive structure guides the allocation of political entrepreneurial effort, just as 
it guides the allocation of business entrepreneurship. All societies enjoy a mix of 
incentives;  political  entrepreneurship  is  allocated  to  both  productive  and 
unproductive/destructive  institutional  reform  efforts,  akin  to  other  types  of 
entrepreneurship. Baumol‘s (Chapter 1) broader theory of entrepreneurship holds true 
for  political  entrepreneurship  in  particular.  While  all  three  types  take  place  in  all 
societies, relative allocation can vary greatly, helping to determine the societies‘ level 
of welfare and rate of growth.  
 
Glaeser and Shleifer (Chapter 17) provide an engaging account of James Michael 
Curley, a political entrepreneur in Boston. Curley intentionally worsened the political 
institutions in the city in order to benefit himself and his constituencies. The authors 
develop a more general model of unproductive political activity, which differs from 
standard models in political economy in important ways.  
 
Entrepreneurial activity in the market is governed by a strong feedback mechanism, 
namely  profit  and  survival.  Where  institutions  are  productive,  individuals  with 
socially beneficial activities make profits, thereby guiding entrepreneurial talent to 
inherently productive activities. Market entrepreneurship is particularly beneficial in a 
social sense as it can efficiently allocate resources using profit and loss as a guide; 
where  institutions  are  unproductive  or  destructive,  individuals  can  become  rich 
through activities that redistribute wealth, or that are purely predatory. The feedback 
mechanism is less powerful for political and institutional entrepreneurship, however 
(Glaeser, 2005). Politicians can hope to be re-elected or elected/appointed to higher 
office, but not all policy entrepreneurs are office holders, and the political reward   14 
mechanism is rather noisy. Singapore‘s national leader Lee Kuan Yew was rewarded 
for his social reforms with a long tenure, but so were Curley, Cuba‘s Fidel Castro, and 
Zimbabwe‘s  Robert  Mugabe.  Constructive  policy  entrepreneurs  are  more  often 
rewarded  for  beneficial  activity  and  punished  for  destructive  reforms  when  the 
broader institutional setting is propitious. The quality of the meta-institutions includes 
the  norms,  values  and  beliefs  of  the  general  public—better  informed  and  more 
socially oriented voters are more likely to reward socially beneficial reforms (Caplan, 
2007; Strömberg, 2004). Rudolf Giuliani‘s tenure as mayor of New York City (1994–
2001) elevated him to national prominence, since the public perceived him as having 
responded to the needs of the city with successful reforms.  
 
Another, perhaps more controversial, conclusion is that market entrepreneurship is 
more  likely  to  be  efficient  and  productive  than  policy  entrepreneurship,  precisely 
because  of  the  weaker  feedback  mechanism  of  the  latter.  Although  both  types  of 
activities can be unproductive when the broader institutional setting is of low quality, 
weak feedback mechanisms ensure that policy entrepreneurship may not be directed 
in a productive way even if the meta-institutions are generally favorable. Furthermore, 
many  barriers  to  political  reform  exist  even  in  favorable  institutional  settings, 
including the need to mobilize a majority, whereas market innovations enjoy lower 
barriers to entry. 
 
 
PART VI  PRODUCTIVE EVASIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
In the case of evasive entrepreneurship, the activities of the entrepreneur do not alter 
the formal institutional setup but rather the impact of institutions already in place. 
Imperfections in the institutional framework can be innovatively used to appropriate 
rents from a third party, exemplified well by the shortcomings in the protection of 
private property rights. Agents may act on such institutional flaws by outright theft or 
fraud, or by pursuing litigation and more sophisticated economic crimes. Productive 
examples  include  entrepreneurs  who  aspire  to  contractual  arrangements  to  escape 
some costly institution. Tax avoidance (legal) and tax evasion (illegal) are typical 
examples.  A  business-owning  entrepreneur  may  engage  in  such  evasive 
entrepreneurship  to  reduce  costs,  while  other  entrepreneurs,  notably  within  tax 
consultancies and law firms, may found a new business based on an innovation that   15 
enables  others  to  circumvent  institutional  barriers.  While  illegal  and  harmful  for 
public finances, tax evasion can be productive if the economic activity in question 
would not  have taken place without such evasion. For example, in many  Western 
European countries with high taxes and strict labor market regulations, immigrants are 
unable to enter the regular labor market. Instead, many of them support themselves as 
self-employed in price-sensitive service professions that are highly substitutable for 
household production, such as taxi drivers, barbers or fast food vendors. It is common 
for this type of worker to evade some or all taxes. However, supplying those services 
paying full taxes may not be viable if enough consumers are unwilling to pay the true 
price of the services, including taxes. The alternative to evasion is in these cases is an 
increase  in  unemployment  and  social  exclusion  of  the  immigrants,  while  the 
consumers are deprived of the service in question.  
 
Other, more mundane, instances of this type include the businessman who uses his 
entrepreneurial talent to trace the right bureaucrat to approach with a bribe. In the 
simplest case, this constitutes an instance of evasive entrepreneurship. One can think 
of  yet  more  elaborate  situations  where  the  entrepreneur  earns  money  by  selling 
services,  all  while  utilizing  knowledge  of  bureaucratic  procedures  or  personal 
acquaintances. The bureaucrat who receives the bribe can also act entrepreneurially 
by increasing the cost of abiding by the institutions, for instance.  
 
Evasive  entrepreneurship  can  be  productive  or  unproductive  depending  on  the 
circumstances. Other times, the evasion of institutions results in a waste of resources 
(such  as  costly  cross-border  smuggling,  rather  than  reg ular  bulk  import).  More 
obvious  examples  of  destructive  evasive  entrepreneurship  include  predatory 
(innovative) criminal activity, as shown in the various contributions  that take up 
altering entrepreneurship.  
 
One criterion to determine if evasive entrepreneurship is productive or unproductive 
is whether the economic activity would have occurred in the absence of evasion. In 
the case  of  weak institutions prohibiting  economic activity, evasion may well be 
productive. When evasion redirects talent to actions designed to re orient resources, 
and when the underlying activity would have occurred anyway within the pre-existing 
institutional channels, the evasion is often unproductive. Méon and Weill (Chapter   16 
18)  provide  empirical  evidence  that  corruption  is  less  harmful,  perhaps  ev en 
beneficial, in countries where institutional quality is low.  
 
Rodrik (Chapter 19) helps define the field by  providing many interesting examples 
that emphasize the importance of creating second-best institutions when the first-best 
institutions have failed.
4   
 
The Hayekian tradition emphasizes the importance of spontaneous order, an evolved 
rather than constructed system of formal and informal institutions. The institutional 
entrepreneur has a natural place in this line of enquiry as agents of change in  the 
continuously evolving social organization, whose actions are in turn constrained by 
the pre-existing institutions. Boettke (Chapter 20) persuasively argues for the role of 
institutional entrepreneurs in Africa, the region in the world with the greatest need for 
institutional  improvement.  Because  of  the  inherent  weakness  of  the  current 
institutional  structure,  productive  entrepreneurship  is  often  evasive —and  abiding 
entrepreneurship is often unproductive and predatory.  
 
In  economies  with  flawed  structures  and  a  lower  level  of  organization,  such  as 
developing  and  transition  economies,  the  coordinating  role  of  the  entrepreneur  is 
particularly  important  (McMillan  and  Woodruff,  2002).  In  these  dysfunctional 
economies,  entrepreneurial  initiative  has  been  observed  to  provide  ―the  required 
protective infrastructure for exchange relations when public governance is failing‖ 
(Boettke, Chapter 20, p. 3).  
 
Evasive behavior by entrepreneurs, including the creation of contracts to overcome 
institutional  impediments,  tends  to  weaken  the  institutions  that  are  being  evaded. 
Indeed, a formal institution that is not enforced will likely lose its practical relevance.  
New contractual arrangements drawn up to evade labor regulations are yet another 
example of this process. As evasion spreads, regulations lose some of their bite, and 
may in time be modified or even abolished to tackle evasion attempts.  
 
                                                 
4 See also Douhan and Henrekson (2010) for a further elaboration along these lines.    17 
This race between regulators and innovative evaders also defines the financial sector. 
Destructive evasive entrepreneurship in the subprime security market contributed to 
the  2008  financial  crisis  as  traders  exploited  implicit  government  guarantees  by 
assuming excessive risk (Calomiris, 2009). Evasive entrepreneurship also  initiated 
institutional changes in this case—albeit in the other direction—leaving them more 
binding and comprehensive.  
 
 
PART VII  UNPRODUCTIVE EVASIVE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
One of the best examples of unproductive evasive entrepreneurship is the growth of 
organized crime. Milhaupt and West (Chapter 21) provide theory as well as empirical 
evidence for the idea that organized crime provides property right enforcement and 
protection services, competing with the state in this provision. By our definition of 
entrepreneurship, individuals who initiate and develop criminal organizations, such as 
Al  Capone  or  Mario  Puzo‘s  (1969)  fictional  Don  Corleone,  clearly  fall  into  the 
category of entrepreneurs (as generally unproductive ones, of course).  
 
Bandiera (Chapter 22) ties the growth of the Sicilian mafia to the inability  of the 
central government to enforce property rights. The Mafia developed as an alternative 
law enforcement mechanism, and evolved into a parasitic organization, although it 
never  fully  abandoned  its  role  as  enforcer  of  institutions.  Bandiera  also  provides 
evidence suggesting that the development of the Mafia grew out of a collective action 
problem faced by landowners: the benefits of hiring thugs to protect one‘s land were 
private, while the cost of the growth of this organization was public and not fully 
internalized.   
 
Investigating  a more commonplace topic, Torrini  (Chapter 23) studies  the role of 
taxes  and the size of government  on self-employment. While high taxes  typically 
reduce the payoff from entrepreneurial ventures, especially since self-employment is 
more directly tied to individual effort, taxes simultaneously increase the return from 
tax  evading  self-employment.  Torrini  presents  evidence  that  greater  perception  of 
corruption is associated with more self-employment, which he interprets as resulting 
from more tax evasion.   
   18 
 
PART VIII  INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN SOCIOLOGY  
 
Sociological  literature  treats  institutional  entrepreneurship  similar  to  the  concepts 
discussed so far, although its framing and perspective are different (Scott, 2004). In 
this rich literature, institutions appear as deeper and firmer aspects of social structures. 
Scott writes, for example, that (1995, p. 33) ―institutions are social structures that 
have attained a high degree of resilience. [They] are composed of cultural-cognitive, 
normative,  and  regulative  elements  that,  together  with  associated  activities  and 
resources, provide stability and meaning to social life.‖ Institutional entrepreneurship 
can  ―account  for  institutional  change  endogenously‖  (Battilana,  Chapter  25). 
DiMaggio (Chapter 24)
5 introduced this function to explain how individuals can bring 
about radical change that oversteps the reach of prevailing institutions.  
 
Prior to  DiMaggio,  prevailing sociological theory could only explain institutional 
change in terms of isomorphism, the process in which organizations spread their rules 
of behavior.  Sociological theory  had difficulty accounting for situations in which 
dramatic change takes place in the opposite direction of in itial institutional inertia, 
such as a rapid shift in the market structure or the fact of a mature firm suddenly 
changing its core business and strategy. Other types of discontinuous change also 
represented  something  of  a  puzzle  to  this  theory.  ―How  can  organizations  or 
individuals  innovate  if  their  beliefs  and  actions  are  all  determined  by  the  very 
instructional environment they wish to change?‖ (Battilana, Chapter 25, p. 654). The 
paradox is to some extent resolved by introducing the entrepreneur. This allows for 
the capacity of agents to ―make a difference‖ and act contrary to what the prevailing 
institutional structure would predict, even changing it in the process.  
 
The  sociological  perspective  that  builds  on  DiMaggio‘s  institutional  entrepreneur 
coincides in part with the definition of institutions found in economics and political 
science,  namely  informal  institutions  such  as  norms  and  culture.  Discontinuous 
change of institutions through individual actions fits well with the idea of political 
entrepreneurs  altering  institutions.  The  sociological  view  of  structures  and 
                                                 
5  Rather,  this  constitutes  one  school  of  thought  on  entrepreneurship  in  sociology.  For  a  seminal 
sociological treatment of market entrepreneurship, see Swedberg (2000). Hwang and Powell (2005) 
survey the neo-institutional literature on institutional entrepreneurship.    19 
institutions,  which  is  reinforced  every  time  individuals  act  in  line  with  them, 
resembles most economists‘ definition of habits and hardwired preferences (Becker 
and Murphy, 2000).  
 
Unlike  sociologists,  economists  see  no  paradox  arising  from  the  fact  that 
entrepreneurs are influenced by institutions at the same time as they contribute to 
institutional change and evolution. Nor do economists view agents as ―trapped‖ in 
institutions,  requiring  entrepreneurs  to  escape.  This  reflects  sociologists‘  much 
broader  definition  of  institutions  and  structures,  including  most  beliefs  and 
preferences. (Sociologists view these institutions as stronger and more binding, and 
comparatively  more  important  than  economic  incentives  or  relative  prices.) 
Ultimately, this difference in perspective mirrors the classical disagreement between 
sociologists and economists regarding the extent to which individuals are free to make 
choices and control their own circumstances. Nevertheless, since sociologists allow 
for entrepreneurs to escape their structural bonds while economists emphasize the role 
of  broad  institutions  and  social  context  in  forming  individual  choice,  the  two 
disciplines are closer to each other regarding institutional entrepreneurship than on 
many other issues.  
 
 
CONLUDING REMARKS: The Interaction between the Entrepreneur and 
Institutions 
 
The influence of entrepreneurs on institutions should not be underestimated. Market 
entrepreneurs  generate  direct  changes  in  institutions,  such  as  transaction  costs  or 
protective technology. Technological change results in new habits of thought and life, 
thus  giving rise to  new institutions.
6 Much technological change is introduced by 
entrepreneurs, and a considerable part of non -technological market entrepreneurship 
also alters economic structures and occasions new institutions.
7  
 
                                                 
6 This argument was first made a long time ago by Thorstein Veblen (Walker, 1977). 
7 Veblen himself did not emphasize the individual entrepreneur as a driver of technological change 
(Gurkan, 2005). Nevertheless, his thesis can be extended to entrepreneur -driven technological change 
in a rather straightforward manner.    20 
Yet Leeson and Boettke (Chapter 13, p. 253) point to another, less circuitous way of 
altering institutions:  productive  entrepreneurs‘  ―creation  of  protective  technologies 
that secure citizens‘ private property rights vis-à-vis one another.‖ These activities are 
most  important  in  weak  institutional  environments,  such  as  in  many  third  world 
countries.  In  the  absence  of  a  well-functioning  government,  entrepreneurs  help 
improve institutions  by  creating private protection methods  that restrict predation. 
These include private law and courts, private police protection, bilateral punishment 
schemes (for example ostracism), reputation mechanisms for multilateral punishment 
of dishonest conduct, and social norms and customs. An example of this process can 
be found in the informal, unwritten rules of commercial activity and private courts in 
tribal  units  in  Africa.  Hwang  and  Powell  (Chapter  14)  consider  the  creation  of 
standards to guide the activities of organizations—itself a form of institution—as an 
entrepreneurial act. In his discussion of second-best institutions, Rodrik (Chapter 18) 
points  out  that  Ghanaian  firms  find  courts  too  costly  as  a  method  of  contract 
enforcement.  Such  firms  have  relied  on  self-organized  measures  of  contract 
enforcement instead, namely relational contracting through personal relationships and 
repeated interactions.  
 
Political  entrepreneurship obviously houses  an  endogenous  component. Productive 
political  entrepreneurship  improves  the  quality  of  institutions,  but  only  in  such 
environments with institutions of high quality where political entrepreneurship can be 
directed  towards  productive  activities  in  the  first  place.  Conversely,  political 
entrepreneurs in countries with low-quality institutions are more likely to engage in 
rent-seeking  activities,  some  of  which  are  likely  to  cause  institutional  quality  to 
deteriorate  even  further.  This  mechanism  forms  the  root  of  the  so-called  natural 
resource curse (e.g., Boschini et al., 2007). 
 
The interaction between institutions and entrepreneurship is not limited to political 
entrepreneurship.  Productive  market  entrepreneurship  can  also  change  the  playing 
field and create new opportunities for political entrepreneurship. British institutions, 
for example, not only encouraged the Industrial Revolution, they adapted rapidly to 
the new technology and production methods introduced by market entrepreneurs. The 
same is true for the recent revolution in information and communications technology 
centered in the United States, which evolved in tandem with institutional changes   21 
pursued by politicians that aided the growth of the venture capital industry (Fenn  et 
al., 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 2004).  
 
These examples illustrate that abiding market entrepreneurship can be complementary 
to  altering  political  entrepreneurship,  both  increasing  the  scope  of  the  other  by 
creating  new  opportunities.  Traditional  market  entrepreneurship  differs  from  other 
factors of production in the sense that its marginal product does not typically diminish 
in the supply of the factor. Additional capital competes with and generally lowers the 
marginal productivity of already existing capital. The same is true for additional labor. 
While entrepreneurs also compete with each other, entrepreneurship is distinct as a 
factor of production in that other people‘s innovations can pave the way for one‘s own 
innovations by creating further opportunities for new ventures (Holcombe, 2007). As 
we  see  it,  such  complementarity  may  also  be  true  for  political  and  business 
entrepreneurship. Yet there is no guarantee that opportunities created by new reforms 
will be used solely for productive policy innovations. Productive market innovations 
may lead to destructive political innovation, especially when the broader institutional 
setting is less geared towards socially beneficial activity. For example, surveillance 
technology developed largely by entrepreneurial IT firms has been used to increase 
political oppression in countries such as Iran and China.  
 
The  feedback  between  entrepreneurship  and  institutions  can  help  explain  the 
discontinuous nature of the dynamics of economic growth. This provides one possible 
explanation for the sudden growth of economies long mired in stagnation, propelled 
by a virtuous cycle of entrepreneurship and institutional change. The breaking point 
of stagnation can usually be traced to either reforms by political entrepreneurs that 
create opportunities for market entrepreneurship, or technological change promoted 
by business entrepreneurs that in turn creates opportunities for productive political 
entrepreneurship.  The  growth  and  reform  cycle  continues  as  more  market 
entrepreneurship  increases  the  possibility  for  additional  institutional  reforms  and 
political returns, which leads to further growth and entrepreneurship.  
 
This volume has investigated the interplay between entrepreneurship and institutions, 
building on the framework introduced by Baumol (Chapter 1) and expanded on by the 
authors included in this volume. Entrepreneurship is not only shaped by institutions, it   22 
also influences them in turn. On the one hand, entrepreneurs choose how to employ 
their  entrepreneurial  talent  depending  on  the  incentive  structure  determined  by 
relevant institutions. In this way, institutions fundamentally determine the distribution 
across  productive,  unproductive  and  destructive  entrepreneurial  activities.  On  the 
other hand, entrepreneurs respond actively to the environment they face, which affects 
the institutions themselves. Thus, changes in institutions should take into account not 
only  the  direct  response  of  entrepreneurs,  but  also  the  subsequent  change  of 
institutions through entrepreneurial feedback.  
 
This feedback may be direct or indirect. Indirect feedback occurs when policy makers 
or political entrepreneurs feel the need to change institutions due to the response of 
entrepreneurs  to  institutions  within  the  given  framework.  Examples  of  indirect 
feedback include the effects of evasive entrepreneurship that weaken institutions (or 
their actual impact), a decline in productive entrepreneurship that forces institutional 
reform, or an increase in rent-seeking entrepreneurship that reduces the legitimacy of 
free-market reform.  
 
Since these types of activities all involve a measure of innovation, politicians cannot 
fully anticipate these effects when designing institutions. The formation of institutions 
should  be  viewed  as  an  adaptive  process.  Politicians  cannot  design  optimal 
institutions  once  and  for  all;  unpredictabl e  entrepreneurial  responses  to  these 
institutions force them to continually change and amend the institutional environment. 
Research  on  the  political  economy  of  entrepreneurship  cannot  be  restricted  to 
analyzing how institutions affect the level and type of entrepreneurial activity. It is 
also  necessary  to  consider  how  entrepreneurial  activities  affect  institutions  and 
thereby the prospects for long-term growth. Institutional changes aimed at promoting 
entrepreneurship  must  always  be  evaluated  with  respect  to  what  kind  of 
entrepreneurship  is  promoted.  A  tax  hike  may  not  only  deter  pr oductive 
entrepreneurs, but also encourage unproductive entrepreneurship. 
 
Finally, it is worth asking whether altering political entrepreneurship can change the 
allocation  of  political  entrepreneurship.  Most  political  entrepreneurship  is  too 
insignificant to palpably change the broader incentive structures. The allocation and 
lucrativeness  of  policy  e ntrepreneurship  changes,  however,  either  through   23 
comprehensive acts of reform by  single policy entrepreneurs or slow incremental 
change. Klein et al. (2010, p. 7) make a similar argument, writing: 
 
While entrepreneurship, like bargaining, takes place in the shadow of the law…, 
public entrepreneurship also involves changes to the very law and its shadow! 
That is, public entrepreneurship involves novelty, change, and innovation vis-à-
vis the rules of the game. 
 
In  terms  of  contemporary  protracted  reform,  various  reform-minded  policy 
entrepreneurs are slowly bringing the old statist system to an end. An example of 
more radical change is the promise to stifle lobbying in the United States (not yet 
realized at the time of writing). Such an act of large-scale policy entrepreneurship 
could change institutions enough to alter the allocation of multitudes of smaller scale 
policy  entrepreneurship,  presumably  reducing  unproductive  political 
entrepreneurship. Positive multipliers associated with this reform would arise due to 
the  mechanisms  we  have  underlined.  Not  only  would  unproductive  lobbying  be 
reduced,  but  some  of  the  entrepreneurial  resources  may  be  redirected  to  business 
entrepreneurship or more productive political entrepreneurship. Perhaps some of these 
activities would someday  lead to additional institutional  improvements.  The  gains 
from channeling entrepreneurship into productive use is thus larger than a narrow 
look at market activity would suggest, and larger still due to innate, hard-to-anticipate 
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